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Psychologists, sociologists, and anthropolo-
gists have emphasized that the cognitive frames 
within which people view the world are both col-
lectively held and malleable over time. Category 
systems have cultural roots and influence what 
attributes people perceive (Eric Margolis and 
Stephen Laurence 1999). The cognitive frames 
operative in a culture unconsciously influence, 
as well, how people interpret whatever informa-
tion they register (see, e.g., Marianne Bertrand, 
Dolly Chugh, and Sendhil Mullainathan 2005). 
Yet economists have generally neglected the 
role played by socially constructed cognitive 
frames. In rational expectations (hereafter, RE), 
each individual is assumed to use all relevant 
information in an unbiased way. 
Recently, economic theorists have investi-
gated the construction of ideologies (see, e.g., 
Edward L. Glaeser 2005 and Roland Bénabou 
and Jean Tirole 2006). They have modeled indi-
viduals as trading off the benefits of subscribing 
to a particular ideology or of suppressing certain 
kinds of information, against the costs that that 
entails. Recent discussions of macroeconom-
ics have assigned a role to Keynesian “animal 
spirits”—emotions that influence confidence—
giving almost unfettered scope to changes in 
beliefs.
All economists agree that perceptions (beliefs) affect actions (choices). We argue here 
that perception is shaped by cognitive frames. 
The infinite set of potentially observable data 
and the infinite ways in which that data could be 
processed are limited by the finite set of socially 
constructed categories that are a part of what are 
called ideologies. Incorporating this perspective 
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helps explain why institutional change can be so 
difficult and societies so rigid. A set of beliefs 
that may have been functional at one time, but 
is no longer so, can persist after the economics/
technology that had led to the adoption of the 
beliefs has changed. We show that allowing for 
“equilibrium bias” in perceptions may explain 
the existence across societies and persistence 
across time of very different ideologies. This 
approach allows for a larger and more robust 
set of equilibria than can be supported by a RE 
model. On the other hand, the set of equilibria 
in our approach is much more constrained than 
the “animal spirits” equilibrium, which pre-
sumes that virtually any set of beliefs could be 
sustained.
While this paper does not provide a fully 
articulated model of the evolution of ideologies, 
it does present a framework that suggests some 
key determinants. Because belief systems affect 
the equilibrium, e.g., by shaping perceptions, 
elites have a strong incentive to influence peo-
ple’s beliefs. In contrast, in a RE equilibrium, 
this is not relevant—cognitive frames play no 
role. But the elites cannot simply “choose” the 
cognitive frames that work best for themselves (nor can nonelites simply choose the beliefs that 
might work best for themselves). The task of 
“choosing” for themselves and imposing on oth-
ers cognitive frames is more complicated and is 
itself constrained by higher order beliefs. Those 
in “power” typically do not control all the deter-
minants of the evolution of beliefs. Cultures are 
always contested. 
Incorporating “cognitive frames” (ideolo-
gies) as state variables provides part of a general 
theory of societal change that is markedly dif-
ferent from traditional theories, in which only 
capital and the distribution of power and wealth 
are state variables. If ideologies change, the 
equilibrium can change, with no change in the 
“fundamentals.” 
We use the example of the construction 
of racial categories to illustrate the idea of an 
 equilibrium social construct (ideology). Section 
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I discusses historical instances. Section II pres-
ents a model in which differentially biased cog-
nition helps sustain the idea of race. Section III 
formalizes the notion of an equilibrium social 
construct. 
I.  Three Examples
A. The Construction of Racial Ideology
to Justify Slavery in North America1
Skin color was not initially an organiz-
ing principle in the colonies that became the 
United States. There were multiple categories of 
coerced labor, and freedom and slavery were not 
yet associated with persons of white and black 
skin. In the seventeenth century, 
“a substantial number of Virginia’s 
Negroes were free or became free. And 
all of them, whether servant, slave, or 
free, enjoyed most of the same rights and 
duties as other Virginians.” (Edmund S. 
Morgan, 1972, p. 18)
Racist codes emerged in the late seventeenth 
century, in response to changes in the econom-
ics of slavery. After 1660, Virginia’s death rate, 
which had been “comparable only to that found 
in Europe during the peak years of a plague,” 
fell sharply. Two consequences were that “an 
investment in slave labor was much more 
 profitable than an investment in free labor,” and 
the engrossment of Virginia’s lands kept many 
former servants landless (Morgan pp. 19, 25). 
In Bacon’s Rebellion of 1676, Virginia’s “Poore 
Endebted Discontented and Armed” turned 
against the elite in a plundering expedition that 
spread across the entire state (p. 22). The fear of 
unrest contributed to the decline in the reliance 
on indentured servants and to the abridgement 
of the liberties of Africans. “To keep as slaves 
black men who arrived in that condition was pos-
sible and apparently regarded as plain common 
sense” (p. 25). In 1712, South Carolina passed 
laws that became the model for slave codes in 
the South. They forbade schooling, church atten-
dance, land ownership, and marriage across the 
1 A more detailed discussion is contained in our
Web Appendix http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=
10.1257/aer.100.2.141.
color line. Given emerging Enlightenment ide-
ologies of equality and human rights, oppres-
sion needed justification. Out of this process, 
two fictions emerged. The first fiction was the 
biological inequality of human beings. The sec-
ond was the natural discontinuity between the 
categories “white” and “black.”
B. The British Imperial Narrative in India
The East India Company in the eighteenth 
century “had become a rogue state: waging 
war … and collecting revenue over Indian ter-
ritory” that produced private fortunes and con-
tributed to famine in Bengal in 1770 (Nicholas 
B. Dirks 2006, p. 13, 252). Parliamentary inqui-
ries brought the scandal to national attention. 
They culminated in the trial of the governor of 
India, Warren Hastings. In his opening speech, 
Edmund Burke declared, “I impeach him in the 
name of the English Constitution, which he has 
violated and broken,—I impeach him in the 
name of Indian Millions, whom he has sacri-
ficed to injustice.” “We think it necessary in jus-
tification of ourselves to declare that the laws of 
morality are the same everywhere” (Dirks, pp. 
105, 107). But over the nine years of the trial, the 
idea that British law applied to agents of Britain 
in India was salvaged not by finding Hastings 
guilty (he was acquitted) but instead by invent-
ing a new interpretation of India. “Built on fab-
rication, colonial history imputed barbarism to 
justify, and even ennoble, imperial ambition.” 
“Scandal became normalized in the assump-
tions and categories of modernity itself” (Dirks, 
pp. xii, 5, 29). A “race theory emerged that cast 
Britons and Indians in a relationship of absolute 
difference” (Dirks 2001, p. 133). 
C. The “Expulsion” of Australian 
Aborigines from the Human Race
 Aborigines were classified as British sub-
jects. “The early governors wanted to see them 
converted to Christianity and farming …—an 
idea loathed and resisted by every white [set-
tler], no matter what his class” (Robert Hughes 
1987, p. 275). One historian characterizes the 
arguments used by the settlers to justify their 
policies towards the Aborigines as entailing the 
expulsion of the Aborigines from the human race (Humphrey McQueen 1971, p. 115). Australia 
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enacted statutes that characterized Aborigines 
as unable to manage their own affairs and 
property, unable to understand rules of evi-
dence, and unable to govern their communities.
D. Ontologies
Given the beliefs in Europe that emerged 
with the Protestant Reformation and the 
Enlightenment,  oppression both called for a jus-
tification and narrowed the basis on which such 
a justification might rest to one based on the 
slaves’ or the natives’ innate inferiority (David 
Hume 1751, p. 88), a “presumed incapacity for 
freedom.” This did not occur, or at least not to 
the same extent, in earlier periods and for other 
regions. In antiquity, natural philosophy in gen-
eral recognized an underlying, universal human 
similarity (Joyce E. Chaplin, 1997 p. 230) but saw 
no wrong in enslaving prisoners of war and colo-
nized peoples. When the Athenians colonized the 
island of Melos, they killed all the men, sold the 
women and children as slaves, and justified their 
action this way: “right, as the world goes, is only 
in question between equals in power, while the 
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what 
they must” (Thucydides, c. 431 BC, book 5.89). 
But after the fifteenth century, racial catego-
ries were constructed and hierarchized and given 
precedence over other aspects of belief systems 
in which oppression might be viewed as unac-
ceptable. The racial categories were entrenched 
and embedded in individuals’ minds through 
ritual and protocol. In Australia, “the racial-
ized designation of space expressed and repro-
duced social and ontological categories on 
which colonial society was founded” (Gillian 
Cowlishaw 1999, p. 63). In the Jim Crow South, 
the unwritten rules that governed day-to-day 
interactions across race lines have been seen 
“not only as a form of social control but also as 
a script for the performative creation of culture 
and of ‘race’ itself” (Jennifer Ritterhouse 2006, 
p. 4). As Charles Evers, brother of the murdered 
civil rights activist Medgar Evers, explained in 
his autobiography, “ ‘Our mothers began tell-
ing us about being black from the day we were 
born. The white folks weren’t any better than we 
were, Momma said, but they sure thought they 
were’—which, Evers implied, amounted to much 
the same thing in practice” (cited in Ritterhouse, 
p. 5). Histories in which there had been an alter-
native to white supremacy were repressed.
II.  A Model of Inequality Based on Fictions
This section expands on Olivier Compte and 
Andrew Postlewaite (2004)’s model of confi-
dence enhanced performance and biased per-
ception to show how a fiction can be maintained 
in equilibrium. The model rests on three hypoth-
eses, each supported by empirical evidence. The 
first is called confirmatory bias: People tend to 
misread evidence as additional support for ini-
tial hypotheses. Experiments demonstrate “how 
providing the same ambiguous information to 
people who differ in their initial beliefs on some 
topic can move their beliefs farther apart” (see 
Matthew Rabin and Joel L. Shrag 1999). This 
bias can also explain how individuals with favor-
able prior beliefs about themselves can maintain 
an inflated view of themselves. 
We call the second hypothesis preconfirma-
tory bias: When people draw inferences, they 
begin with a specification that posits certain 
categories, e.g., racial categories, that they do 
not individually choose (Glenn Loury 2002). 
The third hypothesis is that self-confidence 
boosts performance. For example, in three 
separate experiments, Pamela K. Smith et al. (2008) find that the perception that one is low 
in the social hierarchy lowers performance in 
complex tasks. 
A recent set of experiments with junior high 
school boys in India illustrates the interaction 
among these hypotheses. Children in castes 
that were traditionally Untouchable can solve 
mazes as well as high caste children (Hoff and 
Priyanka Pandey 2006). Yet when students’ 
caste identities are publicly revealed, the per-
formance of the low caste is reduced both abso-
lutely and relative to the performance of the high 
caste. We infer that in other possible worlds, the 
Untouchables could have been an equal or dom-
inant group. It is clear that a social construct has 
affected behavior. 
In our model, individuals undertake a series 
of projects, at each of which they can fail or 
succeed. Confidence, based on a person’s per-
ception φ of his empirical frequency of past 
success, affects the probability of success ρ in 
future attempts, in ways that may be beyond his 
conscious control. Figure 1 shows the relation-
ship ρ = ρ(φ). Under the assumptions of RE, 
there would be a unique equilibrium at the point 
marked RE, where the 45 degree line intersects 
the curve ρ(φ). 
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However, this will not be an equilibrium if an 
individual “forgets,” or rationalizes as uninfor-
mative of future success, his failures with prob-
ability γ > 0. Frequencies of success are random 
variables. But in the long run, a true frequency 
of success ρ  will translate into a perceived fre-
quency of success whose distribution is concen-
trated around a value denoted φ(ρ; γ). 
There are two races, red and green. The crit-
ical hypothesis is that reds are less able to “for-
get” experiences of failure: γred < γgreen. The 
interpretation of this hypothesis is as follows. 
Preconfirmatory bias means that racial cat-
egories are salient—the reds see themselves as 
red, the greens as green. The reds have histori-
cally been treated as inferior, and this affects 
how they interpret experiences of failure. The 
reds see failures as confirming their (socially 
constructed) perceptions of inferiority, while 
the greens dismiss a large fraction of their fail-
ures because such failures are not consistent 
with their prior beliefs (confirmatory bias). 
Equilibrium is the intersection of the produc-
tion function, ρ(φ), and a perception function, φ(ρ; γ). In the equilibrium, beliefs generate a 
level of performance (g or r ) that is consistent 
with those beliefs. The equilibrium is stable 
given the relative slopes ρ′ < φ′. 
III.  The Dynamics of Changes in Beliefs
The preceding section modeled a short run 
equilibrium, given a social construct, namely, 
a racial ideology. Here we formalize the idea 
of an equilibrium social construct. There are 
three levels of “cognition” or belief systems 
in the model: (i) a “lens” S (called ideol-
ogy), through which individuals process data; (ii) using that lens, a set of beliefs about par-
ticulars, e.g., I am competent, which we denote 
by Ai for agent i; and (iii) an überideology (u) 
that affects individuals’ judgments about the 
adequacy of their ideology. Letting boldface 
letters denote vectors (so, e.g., A corresponds 
to the vector (A1, A2, A3,…)), the structure at 
time t is
	 At = F(Qt , St), 
	 Qt	= G(Xt,	At), 
 and Xt	= H(At, St).
The short run equilibrium modeled in the previ-
ous section takes the state variable St as fixed. 
Dropping the subscript t on S, an individual’s 
particular beliefs at time t (Ai,t) are a function 
of outcomes Qt  and the “lens” S. Outcomes are a 
function of behaviors by each agent (denoted Xi,t) 
and particular beliefs. And individual behaviors 
are a function of the particular beliefs as medi-
ated through the lens.  For example, in the Indian 
experiments in puzzle solving, the “behavior” 
may have been effort. Particular beliefs Ai,t  may 
affect outcomes in other ways, too: Low caste 
individuals may generate worse outcomes, e.g., 
number of puzzles solved, when their caste iden-
tities are publicly revealed, because of anxiety 
or other psychological factors. 
The second and third equations can be com-
bined to give Qt = G[H(At, S),	At] ≡ Z(At	,S). A 
short run equilibrium (e.g., an equilibrium fic-
tion) is defined by a value of A that satisfies, for 
a particular S:
 Q* = Z(A*, S)  and  A* = F(Q*, S),
that is, people will generate outcomes that are 
consistent with their beliefs. This equilibrium 
departs from rational expectations in just one 
respect: It posits biased perceptions of which an 
individual is not aware. 
There is a dynamic process,
 St+1 = χ (St, ut, Tt, Vt),
where ut is the überideology, Tt is the “economic 

















Figure 1. Equilibrium with rational expectations (at 
RE) and with biased perceptions (at points r and g).
VOL. 100 NO. 2 145EquILIBRIuM FICTIONS: A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO SOCIETAL RIGIDITY
and Vt is a vector of other variables, e.g., encoun-
ters with other civilizations and their belief sys-
tems. We will not model in detail the evolution of 
ideologies (St). That process, and even more so 
the evolution of the überideology, are idiosyncrat-
ic.2 Losing a war might lead to a change in views 
about racial superiority. An encounter with a dif-
ferent civilization—people who see the world 
through a different lens—might make individu-
als aware of the possibility that their own lens is 
distorted. There may be pressures for ideologies 
to change when the elites discover that there is 
another belief system that does a better job in 
maximizing their well-being. In a democratic 
society, pressures for change may be affected 
by the “median voter” as much as by elites. But 
there is no reason to believe that belief systems 
evolve as if they were chosen by a critical deci-
sion maker. They may be part of an inefficient 
Nash equilibrium, one that does not serve well 
the interests of any group. 
Ideologies and individual observations of 
outcomes, themselves mediated through ideol-
ogy, can provide a set of “conceivable” belief 
systems, among which individuals choose: 
Si,t+1 is chosen by individual i at time t + 1 
from a set Ω(St, At, ut, Λ(Q,A,S)), where the 
set is defined by the previous ideology and 
beliefs, the überideology, and the perception 
of outcomes Λ as mediated through ideology 
and beliefs. This is methodological individu-
alism. These “choices” are affected by the 
social construct. But these individual “choices” 
get aggregated into a new social construct: 
St+1 =  ˆ      Φ(S1, t, S2, t  , S3, t , …Si, t , …,ut, Tt , Vt). 
There is a medium term equilibrium in which 
there is no tendency for society’s belief system 
to change.  The beliefs that we model here occur 
at two levels: individuals have beliefs about the 
nature of society, racial differences, etc., but 
those beliefs are turned into social constructs 
(“belief systems”) through the kinds of mecha-
nisms illustrated in Section I, including legisla-
tion and rituals. What individuals can conceive of 
is affected by the prevailing ideology. To consider 
this in the context of race, it is difficult in a  racist 
2 For instance, notions of equality may have been cham-
pioned by new economic interests to promote free markets, 
but the evolution of these ideas may also have been affected 
by the evolution of deeper philosophical or religious ideas. 
The framework we set forth is consistent with these alterna-
tive interpretations.  
society not to use “racial categories.” But one can 
still believe that racial categories should be out-
lawed and that those who are disadvantaged by 
them would “choose” such a frame. The societal 
frame may, however, not reflect the views of the 
“reds”—the relevant frames are dictated by laws 
and systems of information gathering, and those 
may be controlled by the greens. Alternatively, 
the vast mass of individuals who neither benefit 
nor lose from racism may “switch” their beliefs 
in a process of contagion—when a racist marries 
a liberal, their children may become liberal. The 
überideology of equality may make racist catego-
rizations unacceptable to these individuals. That 
could lead to a system in which there is a sudden 
tilting of the societal perception when those who 
find a racist categorization unacceptable become 
a majority. 
IV.  Conclusion
Ideologies (belief systems, including those 
that determine the admissible categories, which 
structure individuals’ perceptions) are con-
strained by “higher order beliefs.” Beliefs about 
the acceptability of slavery were affected by the 
überideology of equality.  Notions of equality 
made it necessary to invent and institutionalize 
various racial categories to justify certain eco-
nomic relations. But changed notions of equality 
eventually made the notion of race as a basis of 
slavery—and eventually as an admissible cat-
egory for other purposes—unacceptable.
We don’t explain changes in überideology, 
just as we don’t explain changes in technology. 
Changes arise partly from internal dynamics—
a dialectic of ideas—and partly from other 
changes in economics and society.  “Motivated 
beliefs” may help explain change, but not in 
the standard way. The Protestant Reformation 
emphasized individuals’ relationship with God, 
not mediated by authority; and the equality 
of men at least arguably evolved out of these 
religious conceptions. Ideas have their own 
dynamic. For economists to ignore the factors 
that affect how we process information as part 
of the interpretation of economic change would 
be as wrong as to ignore the evolution of tech-
nology itself. 
We agree with the sociologists and anthro-
pologists on the need to incorporate social 
constructs (belief systems) into our models of 
institutions and development. But these scholars 
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have left out that social constructs need to 
be understood as an equilibrium. Ideology 
is a state variable in our theory of societal 
change and development. The theory helps 
explain societal rigidities. No one (including 
the government) can manage changes in belief 
systems. Untouchability, for example, has per-
sisted, at least in some parts of India, despite 
its abolition. At the same time, the approach 
of this paper provides elements of a theory of 
societal change. Technology, contacts with the 
outside world, endogenous changes in power 
and wealth, matter not just directly but because 
they can lead to changes in ideology. 
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